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Abstract. In recent years, evaluation of the quality of academic research has become an
increasingly important and influential business. It determines, often to a large extent, the
amount of research funding flowing into universities and similar institutes from governmental
agencies and it impacts upon academic careers. Policy makers are becoming increasingly reliant
upon, and influenced by, the outcomes of such evaluations. In response, university managers
are increasingly attracted to simple indicators as guides to the dynamics of the positions of
their various institutions in league tables. However, these league tables are frequently drawn
up by inexpert bodies such as newspapers and magazines, using rather arbitrary measures
and criteria. Terms such as “critical mass” and “metrics” are often bandied about without
proper understanding of what they actually mean. Rather than accepting the rise and fall of
universities, departments and individuals on a turbulent sea of arbitrary measures, we suggest
it is incumbent upon the scientific community itself to clarify their nature. Here we report
on recent attempts to do that by properly defining critical mass and showing how group size
influences research quality. We also examine currently predominant metrics and show that these
fail as reliable indicators of group research quality.
1. Introduction
Academia is undergoing profound change. All over the world, positions of leadership and senior
management within universities are becoming professionalised. Whereas in times gone by, such
positions were typically occupied by senior academics, having proved themselves through long
and successful careers in research and education, nowadays professional managers – who lack
such experience – are increasingly empowered. In the never-ending drive for increased efficiency,
policy makers and university managers seek to commoditise all aspects of academic activity
including research. In this context, a plethora of indicators has emerged seeking to measure the
previously unmeasurable. As a result, the academic sector is becoming ever more business-like
and league tables encourage competition over cooperation.
One of the simplest indicator is the size of a research department or group. Funding bodies,
governments and universities frequently claim that these must be above a certain minimum to
be viable. The term “critical mass” has been borrowed from nuclear physics to capture this
notion. An implication of the term, as it is still all too widely understood, is that a group or
department which is subcritical does not have the ability to sustain quality research activity.
It suggests (erroneously as we shall see) the existence of a quantum jump in quality once the
critical threshold is passed – a first-order phase transition, to use the parlance of statistical
physics. Extending the notion, it is often claimed that bigger is always better in research and
that funding should therefore be focused into small numbers of large, elite institutions with
smaller universities relegated to teaching-only roles.
Here we show that, despite their widespread uses, these notions are manifestly incorrect.
They are based upon unfounded and conflated analogies and not on scientific rigour. A proper,
measurable definition of critical mass in the research context has only emerged in the last five
years [1, 2, 3]. It does not entail a quantum leap or first-order transition from low to high
quality. Instead, the critical-mass phase transition is higher order – barely noticeable, in fact.
There is also a second, measurable phase transition as group size grows. This is triggered by
a Ringelmann-type effect and marked by a Dunbar number. The former is due to a slow-down
in the rate of increase of quality with quantity due to coordination losses. The latter expresses
the reasons for these losses, namely cognitive limits to the numbers of interactions individuals
can sustain. In Section 2 we explain these terms in more detail and review their connection to
critical mass.
A second indicator which has recently emerged is the h-index. Again this is very attractive to
policy makers and managers as a simple, zero-dimensional metric which is supposed to measure
quality on an individual level. The notion has recently been extended to research groups in
Ref.[4]. Competing measures include the normalised citation index (NCI) [5, 6, 7]. While the
h-index itself was developed by a physicist, the NCI is an invention of a private company. In the
second part of this paper, we compare both of these against expert peer review measures of the
quality of research groups. We show that the h-index is the better indicator of group quality
but that its role is strongly dependent on group size. We also show that neither of these metrics
is a reliable substitute for expert peer review estimates of quality.
Academics fear the increased use of metrics to measure research activity. The fear is that the
increasingly professionalised management class lacks detailed knowledge of, and appreciation for,
academic subjects and seeks to base judgment and decisions on automated metrics rather than
expertise and academic experience. This, accompanied by a top-down management approach,
bolstered by metrics, and in pursuit of league-table rankings, may impinge upon academic
freedom as researchers are forced to chase arbitrary measures rather than follow where their
curiosity leads. Here we show that these fears are well founded; despite the rising tide of
metrics, they are a poor measure of quality.
2. Evaluation of Quality and Critical Mass
The notion of critical mass in research has been around for a very long time. The basic idea is that
sub-critical research groups tend to produce research of poor quality. Once the critical threshold
is passed, research quality becomes of an acceptable level. This idea has been extended to, and
far beyond, its logical conclusion to the idea that “bigger is always better” so that benefit always
accrues through increasing group size. However, multiple analyses based on citation counts have
produced no evidence for such a concept of critical mass. Despite that, policies based upon this
belief have been developed and implemented and these have serious consequences.
Mark Harrison has studied how government officials allocated funding amongst research
projects in the former USSR. In Ref.[8], he describes how policies swung between phases of
competition and phases based on critical mass. Harrison sees remarkably similar parallels in
the UK’s funding system today. He predicts that the current focus on concentrating research
funding in pursuit of “critical mass” (which itself is misunderstood as we shall see) will eventually
give way to competition, but only after the follies of the policy are declared. By then, he
fears, emerging research groups in promising universities will have lost their funding; small
but excellent research centres will have closed and individual careers curtailed. Amazingly, the
policies in which these dangers are inherent are based upon concepts of critical mass which have
no foundation.
Five years ago, we developed a theory for critical mass and the dependency of research
quality on group size [1]. Our model was successfully tested against empirical data coming from
peer-review based national research assessment exercises in the UK and France [2]. To date,
this model remains the only theory in existence for the relationship between research quality
and group size. A significant amount of literature has been developed since Ref.[1] and all
quantitative evidence supports the theory. There is no quantitative evidence invalidating the
model we are about to describe. Here we recall the model developed in Ref.[1] and how it was
statistically tested against empirical evidence.
It is important to realise that what we are about to develop here is a theory of averages (a
“mean-field theory” in the language of statistical physics). There will always be deviations from
such averages; the brilliant lone researcher, beavering away on a profound topic for years - still
exists, especially in an area like pure mathematics [9]. (We will show, in fact, that critical mass
for that subject is very small – only one or two and perhaps it is unmeasurable.) Also, although
the model predicts higher research success for large groups than small, there are exceptions:
some smaller groups are as good as, or better than some large ones. We could overlay our model
of averages with a random distribution to simulate deviations that always exist, but we feel such
complications would only serve to obfuscate the trends we are trying to capture. With this in
mind, then, we proceed to develop our theory of averages.
A naive assumption (but one that was/is widespread, especially amongst policy makers,
funding bodies and research managers) would be that the strength S of a research group or
department is a simple sum of the strengths of the individuals comprising it. The idea here
is that excellent researchers will be attracted to larger research groups, and the best therefore
become bigger. With this causation arrow, the driving mechanism is quality determining size:
better becomes bigger. If this were the only relation between quality and size, one would
expect to see an unbounded Matthew effect. The Matthew effect, or cumulative advantage, is a
phenomenon whereby “the rich get richer and the poor get poorer”. (The name comes from the
Gospel according to St Matthew, which states: “For unto every one that hath shall be given,
and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which
he hath.”) However, as we shall see, the empirical data does not support this scenario as the
dominant driving mechanism.
Of course, individual strength is itself a function of many factors, including innate calibre,
teaching and administrative loads, management support, the extent of interdisciplinarity, the
availability of suitable equipment, whether the work is mainly experimental, theoretical or
computational, the methodologies and traditions of the field, library facilities, journal access,
external collaboration, grants held, confidence supplied by previous successes, prestige of the
institute and many other factors. We denote the mean strength of the individuals in a group,
resulting from all these factors and more, by a. If the group has N members, then, the strength
of the group would simply be S = aN .
However, research groups are complex systems and we have to take interactions between
individuals into account. We suppose that direct two-way interaction between individuals
produces an added effect and we denote the mean strength of that effect by b. (We consider
three-way interactions, and so on, as collections of two-way interactions, so we need not take
these into account separately.) Since there are N(N − 1)/2 possible two-way communication
links in the group, the strength becomes S = aN + bN(N −1)/2. Note that certain institutions,
publications and league tables refer to “research power” rather than “strength” [10]. We define
research quality s as the strength or power per head, and write s = a1 + b1N .
In fact this is not the full story for there has to be a limit to the number of colleagues
with whom a given researcher can effectively communicate. In evolutionary psychology and
anthropology, this limit is known as the Dunbar number [11]. This was proposed in the 1990’s
by Robin Dunbar who noticed a correlation between the average sizes of the neocortex in species
of primates and the average sizes of their social groups. Dunbar suggested that it represents a
cognitive limit to the number of individuals with whom one can maintain stable relationships.
Extrapolating that correlation to human brain sizes, Dunbar predicts that we can comfortably
maintain social relationships, on average, with about 150 people. Again, this is an average only
- the number can, of course, vary; it has been proposed to typically lie between 100 and 250.
There is a large body of evidence in support of Dunbar’s theory: the estimated average size of
a Neolithic farming village is 150, as is the fragmentation point of Hutterite settlements. It is
also the size of basic units in professional armies in Roman antiquity as well as in modern times
since the 16th century. It is the average village size in the Domesday Book.
In our original publications on the topic, we referred to this limit as the upper critical mass
and denoted it Nc. But it is a Dunbar number for academic researchers and it is discipline
dependent. Once the group exceeds Nc, groups tends to fragment into subgroups. We suppose
that the average number of such subgroups is N/(αNc), so that they have average size αNc.
The strength of the group is then ascribed to the accumulation of individual strengths together
with the strength intra-subgroups interactions, S = aN + bN(αNc − 1)/2. Of course, each of
the N/(αNc) subgroups can themselves interact with another subgroup. If the strength of such
interactions is c, say, the total strength of an average large (N > Nc) group is expected to be
S = aN + bN(αNc − 1)/2 + cN/(αNc)[N/(αNc) − 1]/2. Gathering terms of the same order in
N , we thus arrive at
s =
{
a1 + b1N if N ≤ Nc
a2 + b2N if N ≥ Nc,
(2.1)
where ai and bi are functions of the strength parameters a, b, c as well as αNc. In particular
b2 ∝ 1/N
2
c so that slope of the s versus N curve to the right of the Dunbar point should be
small for disciplines with large Nc values.
To test the above theory, we used empirical data from the UK’s last Research Assessment
Exercise (RAE). The RAE is a peer-review based assessment of the quality of university
research which the Government then uses to decide how funds should be allocated between
different universities, institutions and departments. Not surprisingly, it is taken very seriously
by university managers as well as by researchers themselves. The exercise took place about every
five years up to 2008. In 2014 it was replaced by a somewhat different exercise wherein, besides
quality of research, the impact which that research had beyond academia played an important
role. The 2014 event was called the Research Excellence Framework or REF.
While for the RAE research was categorised into 67 academic disciplines, in the 2014 REF
there were only 36 units of assessment (UoA). Applied Mathematics, for example, which includes
some theoretical physics, was a stand-alone UoA at RAE2008 but it was merged with Pure
Mathematics, Statistics and Operational Research to form a Mathematical Sciences UoA for
REF2014. The 2008 exercise was therefore a more “fine-grained” one and for that reason the
data we report on here comes from the RAE.
In the UK system, research was scrutinised by experts from each discipline to determine the
proportions carried out at each of five levels: 4* (world-leading research); 3* (internationally
excellent research); 2* (research that is internationally recognised); 1* (research recognised at
a national level) and unclassified research. Following RAE, a formula is used to determine how
funding is distributed to higher education institutes for the subsequent years. The original
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Figure 1. The relationship between quality and quantity of research groups submitted to the
UK’s last Research Assessment Exercise in Physics and Applied Mathematics. For Physics
(which is dominated by experimental physics), the Dunbar number marking the breakpoint in
the fitted red curve is Nc = 25 ± 5. For Applied Mathematics (which includes some theoretical
physics.) it is 13 ± 2. The critical mass is half the Dunbar number. The blue dashed lines in
the plots are error boundaries. The purple dotted lines are extensions of the sub-breakpoint fits
and capture some of the top performers.
formula used by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) valued 4* and 3*
research seven and three times more highly than 2* research and allocated no funding to lower
quality research. We can use that formula for the relative values of the various categories of
research as a proxy for quality. If pn∗ represents the percentage of a team’s research which was
rated n*, then, the team’s quality is
s = p4∗ +
3
7
p3∗ +
1
7
p2∗ . (2.2)
With Eq.(2.2) to hand, it is a straightforward exercise to translate the RAE results to
quality scores and plot them against group size.1 Two such plots are given in Fig. 1: one
for Physics and one for Applied Mathematics. Almost all experimental physics submitted to
the RAE were assigned to the “Physics” UoA. Some theoretical also came under the “Physics”
banner but others were entered into “Applied Mathematics”. For our purposes then, we may
consider “Physics” as meaning experimental physics and “Applied Mathematics” as being both
applied mathematics and theoretical physics. Fitting to the formula (2.2) delivered the estimates
Nc = 13± 2 for Applied Mathematics and Nc = 25± 5 for physics. Note how, as expected, the
slopes of the s versus N curves reduce to the right of the Dunbar number. Note also that the
right slope is smaller for the discipline with the higher Nc-value, as expected.
1 While generally throughout this paper, the word ‘group’ means a collection of researchers at a given university
active in a common discipline, in the UK context it means those who were submitted to RAE2008 in a given
unit of assessment. Usually these are permanent staff but they may include postdocs. A group is not, therefore,
synonymous with a department because not all department members may be research active and, therefore, not
all may have been submitted to RAE. Alternatively, a submission may draw from researchers interacting across
different departments. The word ‘group’ in this sense is also not synonymous with research centre, as such
entities may be involved more than one department. Indeed, at RAE, research centres may have been involved in
submissions across more than one subject area. While “group” in this context captures how research is conducted
at universities in countries such as Austria, France, Ireland, Ukraine and the UK, it misses the more hierarchical
structure of, say, German universities, where research groups are more focused around individual senior professors.
We have produced similar plots to those in Fig.1 for a variety of academic disciplines based
on data from RAE2008. The reader is referred to the original literature for details [2]. We
reproduce the Nc values in Table 1 for convenience. Three different candidate Dunbar numbers
were detected for Computer Science. We speculate that this discipline comprises a number
of very different approaches, from the formal and theoretical to the empirical. Similarly in
Archaeology, two candidates for Nc were determined. In Pure Mathematics no breakpoint was
found and since the smallest group submitted had N = 4, we believe the Nc value for that
discipline is that number or less.
We have stated that Nc is the Dunbar number or upper critical mass. However, this is not
analogous the old (unfounded) notions of critical mass as a threshold below which high quality
research is impossible. (Clearly there is no such threshold.) Nonetheless, we can come closer to
the old concept of critical mass [8] with the following considerations.
Table 1. The values of the Dunbar numbers or upper critical masses for a variety of academic
disciplines.
Research discipline Nc
Applied mathematics 13± 2
Statistics & operational research 17± 6
Physics 25± 5
Geography, environment & Earth studies 30± 3
Biology 21± 4
Chemistry 36± 13
Agriculture, veterinary & food sciences 10± 3
Law 31± 4
Architecture, the build environment, town & country planning 14± 3
French, German, Dutch & Scandinavian languages 6± 1
English language & literature 32± 3
Pure mathematics ≤ 4
Medical sciences 41± 8
Nursing, midwifery, allied health professions & studies 18± 5
Computer sciences 1 11± 5
Computer sciences 2 33± 9
Computer sciences 3 49± 10
Archaeology 1 17± 3
Archaeology 2 25± 4
Economics and econometrics 11± 3
Business and management studies 48± 8
Politics and international studies 25± 5
Sociology 14± 4
Education 29± 5
History 25± 5
Philosophy and theology 19± 3
Art & design 25± 8
History of art, performing arts, communication and music 9± 2
Suppose funding for a new academic were to become available. We ask whether it is more
beneficial for society as a whole to allocate the new researcher to a group with N > Nc or to
one with N < Nc. The decision is made by considering the rate of change of strength S = sN
with N . We find that dS/dN is bigger for N < Nc groups provided that N > Nc/2. In other
words, to maximally benefit society as a whole, additional researchers should be given to the
smaller groups provided they are not too small. The cutoff is at
Nk =
Nc
2
. (2.3)
We refer to this number as the critical mass. (In our earlier papers we called it lower critical
mass. In other words, we have established a scaling relation between the critical mass and the
Dunbar number.
We can now divide research groups into three different categories: small (N < Nk); medium
(Nk < N < Nc); and large (N > Nc). These categories are discipline-dependent. For example,
while a team of five pure mathematicians may be considered as “large”, a similar number of
experimental physicists is “small”. This accords with experience.
The overall shapes of the curves in Fig.1 may be ascribed to a Ringelmann-type effect. The
original Ringelmann effect, in psychology and in sports science, is the tendency for individual
members of a group to become less productive as the group size increases [12]. The effect is
due to an increase in inefficiency as the numbers grow. In psychology, this is often ascribed to
motivational losses (also known as social loafing). But coordination losses may also account for
the phenomenon. Here, as in Dunbar’s theory, we also believe that the phenomenon is due to
coordination losses. However, rather than the decrease in the average individual performance
(which would be the actual Ringelmann effect), our model manifests a reduction in the rate
of change of quality per unit staff member. In other words, it is the quality-versus-quantity
gradient rather than in the quality itself that reduces as N increases. The challenge to managers,
therefore, is to counteract or minimise this effect. Can we find point the direction to looking for
a solution? We believe we can do so as follows.
The dotted line in Fig.1 is an extrapolation of the left fit for small and medium groups into the
supercritical region where N exceeds Nc. We refer to such extrapolated lines as “overshoots”.
In the absence of a transition point Nc, if the mechanism which governs research quality for
small and medium universities applied also to the large ones, then the research quality to the
right of Nc would also be expected to follow this line. In other words, the naive model outlined
earlier, and the one upon which many critical mass policies are currently based, would predict
an unbounded Matthew effect along this line. In this case, a policy of continued concentration
of resources would indeed drive up research quality. However, the figure clearly indicates that
this is not the case. Similar figures for other research disciplines may be found in Ref.[3].
Instead, as the figure clearly demonstrates, large research teams tend to have a different
interaction pattern than small and medium ones, as predicted in Eq.(2.1). With a large value
of Nc ≈ 25 for Physics, research quality is saturated to the right of the Nc as Dunbar’s theory
predicts. This suggests that the concentration of more staff into these teams only leads to a
linear increase in research volume and not to an increase in research quality.
However, it is interesting to note that some of the best performing research teams, which
appear as outliers to the overall fit, are bunched slightly above Nc but are well described by
the overshoot. We suggest that this overshoot may be caused by a greater than usual degree
of cohesiveness in these highly successful research teams. Somehow, two-way communication
links are sustained despite their group sizes exceeding the Dunbar numbers for their disciplines.
These are the research groups which are best managed: those in which communication is key.
We have shown that, it is most beneficial to society if new researchers are added to medium-
sized groups. This is because the new researcher brings new links to existing academics in
such groups, helping to drive them to the Dunbar number. However, joining a medium-sized
group is not the best course of action from the new individual’s point of view. For them, it
is better to join a large group. The reason is that a medium group (unless it is on the border
of becoming large) only provides the new researcher with a number of links which is below
their cognitive limit. If they join a large group, on the other hand, they can enjoy maximal
connectivity. (Of course establishing such connections takes time as the intra-group cooperative
network becomes reconfigured.) This returns us to the causation mechanism mentioned at the
start of Section 2. Of course high-quality individual researchers are attracted to high-quality,
large groups. However, that is not how quality grows. Adding more and more researchers
to large groups only increases the volume of high-quality outputs. It cannot increase average
quality significantly because that is already at saturation level. The fastest way to drive up
research quality is to help medium-sized groups attain the nirvana that is the Dunbar number.
3. Quality of Evaluation: Quantitative Indicators
So far, we addressed evaluation of the quality of research and the roles played by Dunbar’s
numbers and critical masses. Now we turn to the second main theme announced in the title of
our paper: the quality of research evaluation through metrics.
Nowadays, many different measures exist claiming to assess academic research excellence
or impact and these are subject to ongoing discussion and debate within the academic,
scientometric, university-management and policy-making communities internationally. A topic
of prime importance is the extent to which citation-based indicators compare with peer-review-
based evaluation. Although flawed in many obvious respects, peer-review remains the only
approach that is broadly accepted by the scientific community. But peer-review exercises such
as the RAE and REF are expensive, both in terms of the labour involved and the time lost
by academics who could otherwise have been engaged in research activity. For example, it
has been estimated that UK universities spent about £4000 for each researcher submitted to
REF2014 [13]. The total cost to the UK of running the national evaluation exercise in 2014
is estimated to have been £246 million [13]. This is a significant fraction of the £1.6 billion
distributed by HEFCE for quality-related research funding in 2015-2016. (That figure is based
on submission of 52 077 individuals, so the funding allocated to universities is over £30,000 per
submitted researcher in that year.)
For this reason, it is desirable for governments, funders and policy makers to introduce, if
it exists, a simple, cheap and reliable way to measure scientific excellence. In the absence of
expert subject knowledge, professional research managers are also keen on such an approach to
serve as a basis for regularly measuring the performances of research groups and individuals.
However, while citation-based indicators and metrics are readily accessible, they are far from
being universally accepted as a way to inform evaluation processes. They are even less accepted
by academics as a way to replace evaluations based on peer review such as the RAE and REF.
In Refs.[14, 15], we considered a citation-based measurement of research at an amalgamated,
institutional or group level, from the natural to social sciences and humanities. In particular, we
examined how that measure correlates with the results of RAE2008. We found that the citation-
based indicator is very highly correlated with peer-evaluated measures of group strength S for
some disciplines. But it is poorly correlated with group quality s = S/N for all disciplines. This
means that, almost paradoxically, indicators could possibly form a basis for deciding on how
to fund research institutions, especially for the so-called hard sciences, but they should not be
used as a basis for ranking or comparison of research groups. Moreover, the correlation between
peer-evaluated and citation-based scores is weaker for soft sciences.
The citation-based measure which we compared against peer review in Refs.[14, 15] was one
provided by Thomson Reuters Research Analytics. This company has developed the so-called
normalised citation impact (NCI) i as a measure of a department’s citation performance in a
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Figure 2. Left panel: The correlation between the normalised citation impact i and peer-
review measures of group research quality s for Physics. Right panel: The correlation between
the absolute impact I = iN and research strength/power S = sN . The black and red symbols
represent large and medium/small groups respectively.
given discipline. The NCI is calculated using data from the Web of Knowledge databases and
by comparing outcomes to a mean or expected citation rate. The measure is determined for
an entire group or department and then normalised by group size. It is therefore a specific
(per-head) measure. A useful feature of the NCI is that it attempts to take account of different
citation rates in different disciplines. To achieve this, the total citation count for each paper is
“rebased” to an average number of citations per paper for the year of publication and either the
field or journal in which the paper was published. Here we denote the NCI specific measure by i.
Scaled up to the size of a group or department, the corresponding absolute measure is denoted
by I where I = iN .
The relationship between i and s for Physics research groups submitted to RAE2008 is given
in Fig.2 (left panel). Clearly the correlation between the two measures is very weak. In fact the
Pearson correlation coefficient is only 0.48. In Refs.[14, 15] we also analysed the correspondence
between i and s for biology; chemistry; mechanical, aeronautical and manufacturing engineering;
geography and environmental studies; sociology; and history. The maximum value for Pearson’s
coefficient was 0.60 (for biology and chemistry). These weak correlations indicate that the NCI
cannot be use to estimate research quality - it cannot be used as a proxy for peer review.
We also ranked the various universities according to their i and s values to see if the NCI
could, at least, serve as a guide to league tables. However Spearman’s coefficient was of similar
weakness to Pearson’s so this is also ruled out.
Figure 2 (right panel) depicts the relationship between the absolute measure I = iN and
strength (or power) S = sN . The correlations are very good. In fact, for physics, Pearson’s
correlation coefficient for these measures is a remarkable 0.96. It is also in the nineties for
the other scientific disciplines (biology and chemistry). However it is lower for sociology and
history (0.88 in each case). The multiplication by N when replacing specific measures by their
absolute counterparts stretches the data sets and the correlations between the rescaling leads
to improved correlations. Moreover, when one partitions the various teams into small; medium;
and large (as explained in the previous section), the correlation tends to be best for large groups.
Nonetheless the conclusion is clear: citation-based measures may perhaps inform, or even serve
as a proxy, for peer-review measures of the strengths of research groups. But they cannot be
used for measures of quality.
In the UK system, quality-related governmental funding for research is strength based; the
amount of money delivered to universities for a particular research discipline is a function of their
S-scores at RAE or REF. The above results indicate that the use of citation-based alternatives
may offer a far cheaper, and less intrusive alternative to the current system. The scale of the
savings that could be made in the UK alone is a quarter of a billion pounds per exercise. Such
a proxy would work best for the hard sciences but would be less reliable for the social sciences
and humanities. Also, it is crucial to realise that such citation-based indicators should not be
used to compare or rank the qualities of research groups.
However, we see a grave danger in introducing any form of citation-based metric to evaluation
exercises. The Hawthorne effect (also known as the observer effect) is the name given to
reactions of individuals when an aspect of their behavior is observed or measured; they naturally
seek to modify that behaviour. This would be disastrous in the academic context; university
managers would force researchers to chase citations instead of curiosity. This would shift the
entire landscape of academic research as everyone chases the same “hot topics” in a bid to
increase their citation counts. It is well known that many profound and important scientific
breakthroughs have come about through mixtures of curiosity, serendipity, accident and chance.
Academic freedom is the cornerstone on which these features can thrive. Combined with
the professionalisation of research management and “businessification” (indeed, moves towards
privatisation) of many third-level institutions, citation-based league tables would pose a serious
threat to academic freedom.
In 2014, Dorothy Bishop arrived at a similar conclusion to us. She used a different metric - the
so-called departmental h-index instead of the NCI. In Ref.[16] we showed that Bishop’s metric
has an even better correlation with the RAE-measured strength index S than has the scaled-up
NCI. The meaning of a departmental h-index of, say, n is that n papers, authored by researchers
from a given department in a given discipline were cited at least n times over a given time period
(we used the periods of assesment for RAE2008 and REF2014). This index takes into account,
in principle, all researchers (not only those submitted to RAE or REF). However, in practice it
can be dominated by a single, extremely strong individual. Also, unlike for REF where authors’
addresses at the census date determine their affiliations for assessment purposes, author address
at the time of publication determines to which university a given output is allocated for the
departmental h-index.
Nonetheless, the departmental h-index is indeed better correlated with research quality; the
Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for between h and s for Physics at RAE2008 were
0.55 and 0.58, respectively.
These correlations are still, however, too weak to replace or inform exercises like the RAE or
REF. To demonstrate that, we decided to use the departmental h-index to predict outcomes,
in terms of rankings, of RAE2014 in advance of their being announced by HEFCE. If simple
citation-based metrics can be used as some sort of proxy for peer review, one would expect them
to be able to predict at least some such aspects of the outcomes of such exercises. Even limited
success might suggest that a citation metric could serve at least as a “navigator” – to help guide
research institutes as they prepare for the expert exercises.
We placed our predictions for the rankings in Biology, Chemistry, Physics and Sociology on
the arXiv in November 2014 (they were subsequently published as Ref.[16].) The REF results
were announced in December 2014. We revisited our study in January 2015 and found that
our predictions failed to anticipate REF outcomes. For example, the Pearson and Spearman
correlation coefficients between the REF-measured s values and the departmental h-index in
Physics were 0.55 and 0.50, respectively. One submission which was ranked 27th in a certain
subject area according to the departmental h-index, actually came in in seventh place in the
REF.
We also sought to predict whether institutions would move up or down in the rankings
between RAE2008 and REF2014. For Physics, the correlation between our predictions and the
actual results was 0.26. For Chemistry it was 0.05 and for Biology it was -0.15. As commented
later, managers would find better estimates of movement in the league tables by tossing dice.
Our results are published as Ref.[17].
4. Conclusions
In the first part of this review, we reported upon the development of a precise definition of
a minimum critical mass for academic research. (In our earlier publications on the topic, we
referred to this quantity as “lower critical mass”.) Contrary to previous intuition-based notions,
this is not a threshold value marking a step change between low- and high-quality research. In
fact it is not directly perceptible or measurable. Instead it is connected, via a scaling relation,
to the Dunbar number for academic research. (We previously referred to this as the “upper
critical mass”.) This marks an average cognitive limit to the number of intra-group research
relationships one can sustain; in a large department, one cannot cooperate with everybody all
of the time. The Dunbar number is discipline dependent; e.g., it is less than or equal to four for
Pure Mathematics and approximately twenty-five for Experimental Physics on average (with a
standard deviation of five).
We showed that concentrating more staffing resources into already-large research groups
does not lift the quality of those groups significantly, especially if the discipline has a high
Dunbar number. This is because everyone already has sufficient links to maximise cognitive
activity. Adding more resources to such a group only serves to increase the volume of high-
quality research. If one wishes to increase quality more significantly, more research staff should
be allocated to medium-sized research groups. The standard is raised by introducing new links,
as relationships between existing staff and the new arrival are established over time.
We noticed in Fig.1, and similar figures for other disciplines, that the best performing groups
are not always the biggest. Frequently groups with size just in excess of the Dunbar number
perform exceptionally well - they are large groups behaving as if they were medium. For example,
in REF2008, Lancaster University with 26 Physics staff submitted, was ranked highest in terms
of quality but Cambridge, with 141.25 staff, was largest. We suggested that these are the groups
within which communication flows easiest and we suggested that these should form a guide for
managers at other institutions to seek to emulate.
We then compared measures of quality of research coming from peer review to a citation-
based measures. The poor correlations mean that such citation indicators cannot be used as
proxies for peer. Nor should such indicators be used to rank university departments or groups
into league tables.
However, the NCI and h-index compare well to the outcomes of peer review when one is
interested in measuring the strength or power, defined as volume of quality. Since this is the
basis on which quality-related funding is distributed, one could argue that a suitable metric
may be developed to replace invasive exercises or reduce their cost. Dorothy Bishop goes a step
further; she suggests to abolish the REF altogether and revert to a block-grant system that
existed before the RAE. She argues that besides not being cost-effective, the REF has numerous
adverse effects on academia.
On the basis of evidence and rigorous analyses produced over the past five years, we are
inclined to agree, but only for well-established universities with large research groups of solid
and long-standing repute. Research evaluation exercises have, however, been useful for smaller
and medium groups as they seek to establish themselves in newer universities which have less
developed research cultures. Some such universities have learned – through the RAE and REF
– that curiosity-driven, pure academic research has value. We suggest that peer review (not
metric-based!) exercises for such groups can and should continue. But they should be extended
to include measurements of the extent to which such institutes promote academic values such as
academic freedom and bottom-up research. In other words, peer review should be more focused
on institutions which can actually benefit from it. Those which are established, and who enjoy
long-standing high reputations amongst their peers internationally, should be allowed to get
on with research. Fig.1(a) shows that very little separates such groups in terms of quality; in
ranking such groups, one is essentially ranking noise.
At the risk of stating the obvious, citation-based metrics measure citation counts, not quality.
These are very different things. We suggest that on no account should one use metrics to decide
policy or inform management. In our opinions, these pose a serious and current threat to
curiosity-driven research which is the very raison d’eˆtre for universities.
Finally we suggest that it is incumbent upon academics themselves, who have the training and
expert knowledge, to turn their methodologies on the scientific process itself in order to produce
evidence to influence the powers that be. The UK recently commissioned an independent review
of the role of metrics in research assessment and management. The remit was “to investigate
the current and potential future roles that quantitative indicators can play in the assessment
and management of research.” The report, “The Metric Tide”, was published in July 2015 [18].
It concludes that peer review continues to command widespread support as the main basis for
evaluating research and there is legitimate concern that indicators, including citation counts and
rankings, can be misused or “gamed.” The report also concluded that no current metric can
provide a replacement for peer review.
A legacy of the Report is the establishment of a forum for ongoing discussion of issues
related to metrics. This aims to celebrate good practices but also to name and shame bad ones.
Inspired by the “Bad Sex in Fiction” award, a “Bad Metric” prize will be awarded to the most
egregious example of inappropriate use of quantitative indicators in research management [19].
This demonstrates the power of turning the evaluation process on itself
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